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View of a Dancer

W

 Aili Bresnahan

estern philosophical aesthetics tends to answer the question What is art?“ by
starting with the perspective of the art appreciator. What does the spectator
perceive in the artistic entity at issue? For example, are these properties formal
and tangible, an arrangement of lines and colors as provided by Clive Bell’s
theory of significant form? Are they contextual—are they, for example, the expression of the
experience of a particular culture? Or are these properties relational in the sense of being a

comment on or response to another arthistorical movement, such as Cubism?
Starting from this perspective, the methodology tends to begin with the appreciator’s
response to the artistic object or product and deriving the artistic entity itself from that. The
methodology then either stops there or takes a look around to see the historical context in
which the art entity arose. It may even go one step further back to artistic intentions, but with
care to avoid running afoul of the intentional1 or genetic2 fallacies.*Whatever intentions of
the artist count must be in the art entity or the appreciative experience of the art entity, and
not solely in the inaccessible mind of the artist alone. It is the perspective of the appreciator
that makes “objective” definitions of art and accounts of the ontology of artworks, art events,
and art practices, defensible. They are answerable to what can be demonstrated to be true by
attention to some feature or property that is accessible to the reader either in theory or in
conjunction with an experience of the art entity. Examples of this methodological approach
can be found in abundance in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, The British


Journal of Aesthetics, and anthologies of articles on aesthetics and the philosophy of art.
This model fits well with art criticism and with the conveniences of academic scholarship
in philosophy, since the philosopher of art need not muck about with artistic processes and
practices, which are often hard to connect in a clear and causal way to the art entity. What are
we to do, for example, with the claim from legendary dance choreographer, George
Balanchine, as reported in Solomon Volkov’s interviews with Balanchine, that the ghost of
Tchaikovsky told him how to choreograph Swan Lake? And what to do with modern dance
pioneer Martha Graham’s claim in her autobiography that her dances derive, in part, from

“blood memory”?
The issue on which I would like to focus now, however, is not on the claims, whether
legitimate or specious, of what art is from the perspective of dance choreographers, but of
what we might learn about dance from the perspective of dancers. What happens to
philosophy when the perspective from which the philosophizing begins is not that of the
appreciator but that of the moving dancer while dancing? What happens when the
philosopher is not at a desk engaging in a contemplative project at a remove from the art
entity but is either right inside of the art entity or, even more radically, is the art entity

altogether in one moving mode of his or her performing and artistic self?3
A brief example from a research project in which I am currently engaged may help to shed
some light on these questions. Does dance, I was asked, have anything to contribute to the
philosophy of temporal experience? I have far more experience as a dancer, having spent 10
years training for a career in professional ballet, than as a dance appreciator. When asked this
question, then, I immediately thought: “How does a dancer experience time?” It was a short
step from there to the question: “How does the dancer experience time while dancing?” Now

we have a moving and experiencing contemplator: a dancing philosopher.
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Here is what happens to the philosophy of temporal experience when the philosopher is
dancing (among other things):



1. It starts with an environmentally situated experience;
2. This experience is embodied and extended in a visceral and kinesthetic way
(neuromuscular, proprioceptive and other systems needed for bodily motion are
activated, vibrations are felt, sounds are heard, etc.);
3. The experiencing philosopher, as part of what is needed to dance, is already (and before
philosophizing) engaged in a project of high awareness of the temporal and spatial
parameters of the piece that he or she is dancing.4
From this starting place, then, any theories of temporal consciousness or experience that treat
awareness of time in ways that exclude bodily, moving, spatial and environmentally
interactive components, seem not only naked but misleading. In isolating only mental and
brainbound processes in the description of temporal consciousness, for example, one starts to
believe (as many philosophers of temporal consciousness do) that time has order and

sequence but has no spatial dimension.5
My claim here, in short, is that the perspective of the philosopher and the conditions
construed as the vantage point from which consciousness and experience takes place has
everything to do with the theory that results. That perspective is not a neutral one—it already
strips away features of actual human experience of time (that of the dancer, say)—to reach
conclusions that find time itself to be something that has none of the features that were


excluded from the beginning!
Of course it is natural for philosophers to begin philosophizing from the perspective of
looking out upon the world from the armchairs of their offices or libraries. The point here is
that one should take care not to mistake that perspective for the only relevant stance one can
or should take to the phenomena, practice, or entity at issue. We are not, after all, only or
always philosophers in armchairs and we are certainly not brains in vats. If a philosopher who
is also a dancer, for example, is asked how temporal experience arises in dance, she just
might decide that the more relevant stance from which to consider this question is not from
the perspective of the seated observer but from relevé en pointe followed by a sequence of
chaine turns. From this perspective time is experienced as part of a thoroughly spatio
temporal experience. A theory of this experience in terms of consciousness that included only
computational brain processes without considering feedback from the body and the

environment outside of the body seems nothing short of bizarrely truncated and inapt.6
At this point, the reader may be wondering what this example has to do with philosophy
overall rather than with the very tiny (but growing!) area of philosophy that is the philosophy
of dance. Here is the answer: Considering temporal experience in dance from the perspective
of dancing is not only relevant to understanding dance but it is relevant to understanding the
extent to which perspective of contemplation can affect the analysis of the phenomena or
entity being analysed. We (human beings, thinkers, cognizers, philosophizers, persons,
selves) are not always or typically in contemplative postures. We walk, run, drive cars, ride
bicycles, gesture, laugh, move, eat, plant gardens, bake bread, make love, eat, talk, sleep, play
sports, engage in conversations and debates, and more. All of these activities are part of our
experiences and of our consciousness—they are not addons to some substrate “I” that has no
body, no interactions with the world, and exists in pure abstraction from the world in which
we find ourselves. Viewed in this way the dancing philosopher is not a strange or unusual
entity. He or she is just a philosopher who is living, moving, breathing, and interacting with
the world (are there any philosophers who do not do this or who did not do this while they
were alive?). The dancing philosopher just has the moving, interacting, kinaesthetic aspects
human of personhood as an essential part of his or her intentional agency in heightened form. 
The study of dance, then, and in particular the perspective of dancers, has much to offer
philosophy. Philosophy need not take the perspective of an observer or
appreciator/thinker/understander who is ideal, anonexistent in actuality, disembodied, and
disengaged from environmental interaction. Let us no longer impoverish philosophy in this
way. Let philosophy live, breathe, move, interact, and, yes, dance.
φ
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